What exactly did happen on 15th April 1989?

In response to poor information, myths and plain lies about what happened at Hillsborough, the following facts may help people better understand what happened on the day and in the aftermath of the disaster.

It is presented in a concise, factual manner, there are no opinions expressed, just historical, verifiable, facts.

Nicola McMillan is the author, edited by Jim Sharman.

On Saturday April 15th 1989 a fatal crush occurred on the terraces of the Hillsborough football stadium. It was the worst disaster in British sporting history, as 96 people died and hundreds more were injured. The Disaster became known simply as Hillsborough’

What follows is a reconstruction of the key events that led to, and caused, the Disaster. The history of official investigations, as well as legal cases pursued, are also detailed.

The information and findings that emerged from those events are concisely reported herein. In summary, these are the facts behind the Disaster.
The Stadium - Grounds for Concern

1981, FA Cup Semi Final, Spurs v Wolves: Spurs had a larger average gate than Wolves yet were allocated the much smaller Leppings Lane end, resulting in 38 Spurs fans sustaining crush injuries. Police helped fans out of the enclosure. So concerned was the FA that it moved such games from Hillsborough for six years.

In spite of Sheffield Wednesday Football Club (SWFC) having altered the terrace design to five pens, there was documented evidence of crushing in the pens during the 1987 and ‘88 semi-finals (para 1 Interim Taylor Report [ITR]).

1988 & ’89 FA Cup Semi Finals: Liverpool FC challenged the decision to allocate Leppings Lane to their fans; in ‘88 due to allocation size, whereas the ‘89 objection was due to the complaints of crushing that fans had experienced in ‘88. South Yorkshire Police (SYP) refused to switch ends (para 36 ITR).

The Pens

The official capacity of the central pens was estimated at 2,000. The Health & Safety Executive (HSE) later found that should have been reduced to 1,600 as the crush barriers didn’t conform to ‘The Guide to Safety at Sports Grounds 1986’. Approx 3,000 Liverpool fans were in these pens by kick off. BBC commentator, John Motson, specifically mentions the emptier wing Pens.

The police had also noted the uneven distribution & overcrowding; a tannoy announcement was made for fans in the central pens to move forward to make room for others (para 59 ITR). At no point did police attempt to close the central pens and filter fans into the wing areas.

Common practice was for the doors at the tunnel head to be closed once police estimated the central pens were full, with remaining fans to be directed to the outer pens.

This was Chief Superintendent Duckenfield’s first time in charge of policing such a big game; no such forethought to follow established protocol was given as he gave the order to open Exit Gate C. Earlier that afternoon, CI Creaser asked Superintendent Murray whether the pens should be filled one-by-one, but was told that they should all be available and the fans should ‘find their own level’(para 58 ITR).
The Decision to Open Exit Gate C & The Consequences

This undoubtedly relieved the congestion outside the turnstiles; SYP claim they couldn’t have foreseen the consequences of opening the gate (allowing fans to walk undirected towards already-full central pens.) Several witness are on record refuting this.

An SWFC steward is on record as having told police there’d be a crush if Gate C were opened. Another steward, Jack Stone, was asked four times to hand over keys to his Gate A but he refused and later said, “I knew all hell would be let loose if they opened those gates.?

There is a commonly-held belief that ticketless Liverpool fans entered via Gate C and rushed into the already-full central pens, resulting in those supporters at the front being crushed to death (BBC’s ‘Politics Show’ 02/12/07 is the latest example of this). However, CCTV images show that while the gate was open for 5 minutes, fans walked, not rushed, into the ground and, without direction, headed unknowingly straight for the 40ft dark tunnel, leading to the central pens.

Failure to steer people away from that tunnel (and to close it) led to a fatal crush.
Controlling the crowds

Both SYP and Liverpool fans believed that a loss of control contributed to the Disaster; the reasons why control was lost are where the two groups differ.
South Yorkshire Police’s view

SYP admitted its role in the Disaster but accused Liverpool supporters of being late, drunk, ticketless, aggressive and unruly. The Police claim they had no option other than to allow these supporters entrance to the ground and thereby the central pens. Their failure to follow protocol was criticised by Lord Taylor throughout his report; he emphasised that the decision to open the gate and not direct the fans to the empty wing pens was, “a blunder of the first magnitude? (para 231, ITR)

The first open allegation came from Duckenfield directly: as the Disaster unfolded he declared Liverpool fans had forced the gate open and rushed in. However, a BBC TV camera filming outside the ground proved this was a lie (para 283 ITR).

Police Federation Officer Paul Middup was interviewed by ITV later that evening, stating that the fans were worse the wear for drink, were “hell-bent on getting in? and “500 plus? were without tickets.

Irvine Patnick, MP for Sheffield Hallam, went far further; his damning allegations to The Sun report him saying that some Liverpool fans pick-pocketed from the dead, some urinated on the dead, some beat up a police officer giving the kiss of life. He was not even at the game, so could not have witnessed any of the above himself. Nevertheless his comments were widely used, causing incalculable distress to victims’ families and survivors. Not one witness at the inquiry supported any of the allegations (para 257 ITR): all were proven false.

April 16th 1989: Prime Minister Margaret Thatcher and Press Secretary Bernard Ingham were shown around the stadium and visited the fans in hospital. He later said, “I know what I learned on the spot; there would have been no Hillsborough if a mob, clearly tanked up, had not tried to force their way into the ground” (P. Scraton, ‘Death on the Terraces, p184). He has subsequently admitted that he neither spoke to a single Liverpool fan nor ever sought their opinions on what happened.

April 21st 1989: Douglas Hurd inferred in the House of Commons that 19 police officers had been assaulted at Hillsborough and that SYP were collating the information to pass on to the Inquiry.

May 3rd 1989: Under questioning, Mr Hurd was unable to state how those injuries were sustained. No mention of these 19 injured officers was made in the Interim Taylor Report. During the Disaster, 18,000 photographs and 71 hours of film footage were taken. Not a single picture or piece of video footage has been found to support whatsoever the allegation of police officers being physically assaulted.

Analysis of SWFC’s electronic admission system, HSE’s analysis and eye-witness accounts - including two SYP officers - showed there was no evidence of a high number of ticketless fans.

HSE gave three admission figures based on their analysis, with the ‘maximum estimate’ being 10,124. Even this shows there were only 24 people more than the 10,100 allocated (see 5.8, 6.2 & 8.1 of HSE report or para 200/1/2/3 ITR).
The Supporters’ Experiences

LFC supporters attribute the Disaster to a failure of police control and lack of communication and organisation (para 223/4/5 ITR).

All 23 turnstiles for the 24,256 LFC fans were situated at the Leppings Lane End, with just 7 for the 10,100 terraces fans. By contrast, NFFC’s 29,800 fans had access to 60 turnstiles, running the length of the ‘Kop’ End and South Stand (para 187 ITR).

The ITR makes several references to the allocations, information printed on the tickets, the confusing layout of the stadium and poor sign-posting as all being contributory factors to the formation of large crowds outside the turnstiles. The decision not to pre-filter fans ahead of the turnstiles, as was done the previous year, is also criticised. This measure would have allowed fans with ‘Seated’ and’Standing’ tickets to be filtered properly and given accurate directions. Lord Taylor criticised the decision to open Gate C, as opposed to delaying the kick-off. Two police officers are noted as informing Duckenfield that they couldn’t get all the fans inside the ground by 3pm and that they should therefore delay kick-off. Their objections were noted but rejected (para 62 & 65 ITR).

Lord Taylor believes that even if the allocation had been switched the outcome could have well been the same (para 272 ITR). This underlines the importance of effective crowd control in a stadium with disproportionate access points.

Taylor also criticised SWFC, their safety engineers and the local authority, which had failed to issue an up-to-date licence for the stadium. But he directed his most damning conclusions towards the SYP. Most pertinently, the ITR categorically dismissed all theories of bad behaviour, drunkenness and ticketless LFC fans as a contributing factor to the Disaster and subsequent loss of police control.
The Police Response to the Disaster:

As the Disaster unfolded, Taylor says that Duckenfield “froze? (para 284 ITR). Vital minutes that could have been used to save lives were wasted during this period due to his inaction.

In the police control room, officers overlooking the Leppings Lane terrace had access to five TV screens that were capturing live CCTV images. The cameras all had zoom capability and were functioning fully on the day (para 50 ITR). Police also had radio communication capability with officers in the stadium (para 53 ITR). The tapes were stolen from the control room, a crime and motive still as yet unsolved.

Not only supporters questioned the lack of control and organisation. In the midst of the tragedy the pre-agreed emergency plan was not initiated. This led to pitch-side police officers, St Johns Ambulance staff and off-duty medical personnel also heavily criticising the lack of communication and organisation to treat the injured. It took too long for ambulances to reach victims and indeed many were held outside the ground, as it was still believed the unfolded Disaster was ‘crowd trouble’ (i.e. hooliganism) and not crushing.
The Liverpool Supporters’ Response to the Disaster

Liverpool supporters on the day took the initiative to help their fellow fans in many different ways: those in the Upper Tier reached down to help pull people out of the central pens, they used advertising boards to ferry supporters outside the ground and they tried to resuscitate the injured. Taylor describes the efforts of these supporters as “magnificent? (para 255 ITR).
Criminal Proceedings Against South Yorkshire Police

August 4th, 1989: Lord Taylor’s Interim Report published; he identified several causes for the Disaster, the immediate cause being the failure to cut off access to the already-full central pens. He criticised senior officers for “failure of control?.

Coroner inquests were held, restricted to where and when each named victim died. West Midland Police submitted the timeline evidence for each death; no cross-examination was afforded. Pathologists stated people died quickly and didn’t experience persistent pain.

The Coroner then imposed a cut-off time of 3.15pm, stating victims would all have received their fatal injuries by this time. There was no inquiry into the lack of emergency response.

The Inquest’s jury returned a majority verdict (9-2) of ‘Accidental Death’. The Director of Public Prosecutions, Alan Green, said there was insufficient evidence to bring criminal proceedings against any individual. No reasons were given.

The Police Complaints Authority told SYP to lodge disciplinary charges against Murray and Duckenfield. Murray faced one charge of neglect of duty, Duckenfield four charges of neglect of duty and one of discreditable conduct. Duckenfield was allowed to resign on health grounds and it was therefore felt unjust to continue charges against Murray. The disciplinary procedure was never concluded.

Six victims’ relatives tried to overturn the verdicts of the inquest. The High Court refused, referring in their final verdict to the biggest sporting Disaster as having occurred at an FA Cup Semi-Final between LFC and SWFC.

May 1997: Home Secretary Jack Straw ordered Lord Justice Stuart-Smith to scrutinise all the evidence, but such a ‘scrutiny’ affords no legal representation or procedure. He evidently had pre-conceived ideas of the disaster as on 06/10/97, when visiting families at the Maritime Museum, he asked one bereaved father, “Have you got a few of your people or are they like the Liverpool fans, turn up at the last minute?”

It later emerged that a draft of the report was apparently circulated in advance to parties who were likely to be criticised. It seems they were allowed to comment on the draft before it went to print. The final report shows little criticism of SYP and their solicitors. Stuart-Smith’s draft shows his original concern that witness statements had been altered to edit out any comments that were adverse to SYP, but comments adverse to the fans were left in. This concern wasn’t mentioned in his final report, just “it would’ve been better? had the deletions not occurred.

Jack Straw accepted the findings, stating that there were no grounds to order a fresh inquiry.

In 1998 the Home Office made available police officer statements from the day. The statements show the extent to which they were edited.

August 1998: The Hillsborough Family Support Group launched civil suits against Duckenfield and Murray, filing charges of ‘manslaughter’ plus ‘wilful malfeasance in public office’. A further charge of ‘perverting the course of justice’ was filed against Duckenfield in relation to his lie about LFC fans forcing open Gate C.

July 24th, 2000: After much legal wrangling, the case had been put to a jury in Leeds but they cleared Murray and could not reach a verdict on Duckenfield. Mr Justice Hooper refused a re-trial, suggesting it would constitute clear oppression and saying, “I have an overriding duty to ensure a fair trial for the defendant. That, I am firmly convinced, is no longer possible.”.

April 2008: As things currently stand, bereaved parent Anne Williams is actively pursuing a case in the European Courts, challenging the circumstances under which her child, Kevin, died whilst in state care. Qualified eyewitness evidence suggests Kevin was still alive after 3.15 pm.

It is thought that he could have been saved had simple medical attention been made available at the time. Judgment in this case is, at the time of writing, now overdue.